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ABSTRACT
In this paper, we discuss security of public-key cryptographic primitives in the case that the public key is fixed. In the
standard argument, security of cryptographic primitives are evaluated by estimating the average probability of being suc-
cessfully attacked where keys are treated as random variables. In contrast to this, in practice, a user is mostly interested in
the security under his specific public key, which has been already fixed. However, it is obvious that such security cannot
be mathematically guaranteed because for any given public key, there always potentially exists an adversary, which breaks
its security. Therefore, the best what we can do is just to use a public key such that its effective adversary is not likely to be
constructed in the real life and, thus, it is desired to provide a method for evaluating this possibility. The motivation of this
work is to investigate (in)feasibility of predicting whether for a given fixed public key, its successful adversary will actually
appear in the real life or not. As our main result, we prove that for any digital signature scheme or public key encryp-
tion scheme, it is impossible to reduce any fixed key adversary in any weaker security notion than the de facto ones (i.e.,
existential unforgery against adaptive chosen message attacks or indistinguishability against adaptive chosen ciphertext
attacks) to fixed key adversaries in the de facto security notion in a black-box manner. This result means that, for exam-
ple, for any digital signature scheme, impossibility of extracting the secret key from a fixed public key will never imply
existential unforgery against chosen message attacks under the same key as long as we consider only black-box analysis.
Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
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A security notion of cryptographic primitives is addressed
by a combination of an adversarial goal (GOAL) and an
attack model (ATK), and we say that a cryptographic prim-
itive satisfies GOAL-ATK security if no adversary can
break it in the sense of GOAL even if access to oracles,
which are determined by ATK, is allowed. In particu-
lar, for a digital signature schemes, existential unforgery
(EuF)-chosen message attack (CMA) where EuF and CMA
denote existential unforgery and adaptively chosen mes-
sage attack, respectively, is considered as the standard
security notion. As for a public key encryption scheme,
indistinguishability (IND)-chosen ciphertext attack (CCA)
where IND and CCA denote indistinguishability of plain-
texts and adaptively chosen message attack, respectively,
is the standard one. These two notions also imply univer-
sal composability [1,2], which guarantees that the security
will not be degraded under concurrent use with other
cryptographic primitives.
Indeed, so far, a number of digital signature and pub-
lic key encryption schemes, which are provably EuF-CMA
or IND-CCA secure, have been proposed where we say
a cryptographic primitive is provably GOAL-ATK secure
if existence of an adversary ,which breaks it with a non-
negligible probability in the sense of GOAL-ATK, always
implies existence of an algorithm, which solves the under-
lying mathematically hard problem, which is assumed
Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. 1663
A limitation on security evaluation of cryptographic primitives with fixed keys Y. Kawai et al.
intractable. Here, we also notice that the probability of
succeeding in the attack is estimated by taking the pub-
lic key as a random variable, and therefore, even provable
EuF-CMA security does not immediately imply that the
digital signature scheme securely works under a specific
public key. However, in the real world usage, once a key
of a digital signature scheme is generated, a user keeps to
use this fixed public key for a relatively long-time period.
Thus, from the viewpoint of users, security under their
fixed keys is more important than the average security over
all keys. Actually, there is no contradiction even if in a
provably EuF-CMA secure digital signature scheme, there
exists a public key whose corresponding secret key is eas-
ily recovered. In an asymptotic sense, the probability of
picking such a weak key is negligible if the scheme is
provably EuF-CMA secure. However, in practical systems,
for achieving higher efficiency, we often choose a security
parameter that the previous asymptotic argument does not
always make sense. For example, even if a cryptographic
primitive yields 80-bit security in average over all possi-
ble choice of keys, there is still possibility that there exist
weak keys such that an adversary can succeed in an attack
with probability 2–60.5 for these keys and the probabil-
ity of picking one of these keys is 2–20.5. For preventing
picking such a weak key, one may use cryptographic prim-
itives whose worst case security is proven to be equivalent
to the average case security, or example, [3,4]. However,
these schemes are generally less efficient than other practi-
cal schemes. Therefore, it is beneficial if we can somehow
evaluate security under each specific key.
Unfortunately, when fixing a public key, it becomes
absolutely infeasible to prove that there exists no effective
adversary, which breaks the cryptographic primitive in any
sense under the fixed key because it always exists in theory.
Therefore, the best what we can do is just to use a public
key such that its effective adversary is not likely to be con-
structed in the real life. Regarding this concept, Rogaway
[5] proposed and formalized the notion of human igno-
rance, and investigate security of cryptographic primitives,
for example, hash-then-sign signature, under the usage of
collision-resistant hash function without the key, assuming
that any effective adversary against the collision-resistant
hash function (which always exists in theory) will never
appear in the real life. The notion of human ignorance
seems also useful for analyzing digital signature and/or
public key encryption with the fixed key, and thus, it is
desired to provide a method for evaluating the level of
human ignorance of these cryptographic primitives.
1.2. Our results
1.2.0.1. Social Oracle and Fixed Key Security.
Because for a fixed key, human and accidental factors
significantly depend on the possibility of constructing an
effective adversary (which potentially exists in theory) in
the real life; it is hard to mathematically evaluate how
likely it is. (For example, we can immediately find the dis-
crete logarithm x if the given the instance is gx = g because
we memorize x = 1 in such a case. This is not mathematical
weakness but a human factor.) Thus, for investigating such
possibility, we will model the human society as a massive
Turing machine, which on input a program code of a cryp-
tographic primitive and a fixed key, returns a program code
of the most effective adversary against them among ones
which human society can produce in the real life. We call
this Turing machine social oracle SO.
We define that a cryptographic primitive … is fixed key
secure (or human ignored [5]) in the sense of a security
notion goal.atk on a fixed public key pk if for query
(…, pk,goal.atk), the social oracle does not return any
effective adversary with respect to goal.atk. From the
property of the social oracle, we see that this is a rea-
sonable definition of security under a fixed key. Now, our
intention is to somehow predict the social oracle’s answer
SO(…, pk,goal.atk) before querying (…, pk,goal.atk).
1.2.0.2. Impossiblitiy of Reducing to Weaker
Notions. As our main result, roughly speaking, we
show that there is no better method for forecasting
SO(…, pk,goal.atk) than the previous naive methods as
long as we consider only black-box reductions if goal.atk
represents a practical level of security. This also implies
that the standard security notions, that is, EuF-CMA and
IND-CCA, which take keys as random variables, are con-
sidered the most appropriate notions among what we can
treat in practice.
More specifically, we investigate (in)feasibility of nar-
rowing the space of adversarial strategies, which we have
to take into account and show that it is absolutely impossi-
ble unless the program code of the adversary is explicitly
used in analysis. Here, we say that the space of strate-
gies can be narrowed if for knowing SO(…, pk,goal.atk),
it is sufficient to know SO(…, pk, wgoal.atk), where
wgoal.atk is a strictly weaker security notion than
goal.atk in the sense that (…, pk) is always vulnerable
under the notion of goal.atk if it is vulnerable under the
notion of wgoal.atk, but not vice versa. For example,
when the user wants to examine existential unforgeabil-
ity (against any attack model) on his fixed key, if it is
proven that he does not need to try forgery of a signature
for a specific message, the space of adversarial strategies is
considered narrowed.
Thus, our result can be interpreted that for any digital
signature scheme (resp. public key encryption scheme) and
any fixed key, the de facto security notion, that is, exis-
tential unforgery against adaptive chosen message attacks
(resp. indistinguishability against adaptive chosen cipher-
text attacks), cannot be reduced to any weaker security
notion if only black-box reductions are considered. In other
words, under black-box analysis, human ignorance of suc-
cessful adversaries in the sense of the de facto security
notion on a fixed key will never be implied by that of any
weaker security notion on the same fixed key.
As a folklore, it is already (but informally) known
that for any digital signature scheme (resp. public key
encryption scheme) and any fixed key, security against
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adaptive chosen message attacks (resp. adaptive chosen
ciphertext attacks) cannot be reduced to security against
key only attacks [6]. However, we stress that our impos-
sibility results are significantly stronger than this because
ours imply that there is completely no way for reduc-
ing the de facto security notion under a fixed key to any
weaker notion under the same fixed key if we depend on
only black-box analysis. Furthermore, our results take into
account not only weaker notions but also a considerably
wider range of security notions. Namely, loosely speak-
ing, we show that it is also impossible to reduce the de
facto security notion to any other notion, which is weaker
in terms of either the adversarial goal or the attack model
and, thus, as far as this condition is satisfied, even any
stronger adversarial goal and attack model are addressed
in our results. Furthermore, our results also imply that it
is impossible to construct an adversary against any weaker
security notion by using that against the de facto security
notion in black-box manner even if the latter’s running
time is considerably short.
1.3. Related works
So far, possibility/impossibility results on cryptographic
primitives have been intensively studies in the litera-
tures. For example, in [7–11], it is shown that if one-way
functions exist, then there also exist private key encryp-
tion, authentication, digital signature, bit commitment, and
zero-knowledge proof. On the other hand, Impagliazzo
and Rudich [12] considered various black-box settings and
showed a black-box construction of key agreement based
on one-way functions implies a proof that P ¤ NP in
one model. Furthermore, in a more constrained model,
they showed that the black-box construction is uncondi-
tionally impossible. A line subsequent works of [12] used
their methodology or new variants to show black-box sep-
arations as follows. Kahn, Saks, and Smyth showed that
a black-box separation between one-way functions and
one-way permutations. Simon [13] showed that a black-
box separation between one-way functions and collision-
resistant hash functions. Gertner, Kannan, et al. [14] and
Gertner, Malkin, and Reingold [15] showed that a black-
box separation among key agreement, oblivious transfer,
public-key encryption, and trapdoor functions. Reingold,
Trevisan, and Vadhan [16] reconsidered the results of [12],
and strengthened some previous results. In [17–19], it is
shown that black-box constructions suffer from inherent
efficiency limitations.
All previous impossibility results cannot treat fixed key
security. The previous results related to our paper (but
does not focus on fixed key security) are as follows. In
[5], Rogaway introduced a novel direction of studying
impossibility/possibility for treating cryptographic primi-
tives that always theoretically exist but are not likely to
be constructed in the real world and called this notion
human ignorance. Furthermore, for discussing such kind
of primitives, he addressed that it is important to (not
merely give a security proof but) explicitly construct an
adversary, which breaks the basic primitive whose effective
adversaries are considered human ignored. For investigat-
ing (im)possibility of (extensions of) black-box reductions,
Paillier et al. presented some useful techniques in [20–22].
For example, in [20], (im)possibility results for discrete
log-based signatures (e.g., Schnorr signature) under dis-
crete log, and one more discrete log assumptions are
shown. Because we address a class of human ignorance,
similar techniques (i.e., meta-reduction techniques under
key-preserving black-box reductions) to theirs are also
used in this paper. More recently, impossibility results
based on meta-reductions techniques have appeared in a
number of works, for exmaple, [23–33], to name a few.
See [34] for a good survey on this topic. Fischlin and Fleis-




In this paper, for simplicity, we assume that all keys are
generated at time 0 and their life time is ended at time T .
Then, we say that an Algorithm A is a real-life adversary
if it is explicitly implemented at some time T 0 such that
0  T 0 < T and its running time is less than T – T 0. We
also say that an Algorithm A is a ˛-practical adversary
if it is explicitly implemented at some time T 0 such that
0  T 0 < ˛T and its running time is less than ˛T – T 0,
where 0 < ˛  1. Obviously, a one-practical adversary is a
real-life adversary, and an ˛-practical adversary is always
a ˇ-practical adversary for all ˛ and ˇ such that ˛  ˇ.
Roughly speaking, ˛-practical adversaries are a powerful
class of real-life adversaries that succeed in the attack sig-
nificantly earlier than T . Consequently, even if it is proven
to be generally impossible to construct a real-life adversary
against some weaker security notion from that against the
de facto security notion, it might be still possible to con-
struct the former from an ˛-practical adversary against the
de facto security notion.
2.2. Digital signature and public
key encryption
A digital signature scheme is given by a triple of algo-
rithms, † = (Gen,Sig,Ver). Gen, the key generation
algorithm, takes as input a security parameter, and returns
a pair (pk, sk) of matching public and secret keys. Sig, the
signature generation algorithm, takes as inputs a secret key
sk and a message m and returns a signature  = Sigsk(m).
Ver, the verification algorithm, takes as inputs a public key,
a message, and a signature and outputs 1 if and only if  is
valid on m, or 0 otherwise.
A public key encryption scheme is given by a triple of
algorithms, … = (Gen,Enc,Dec). Gen, the key gener-
ation algorithm, takes as inputs a security parameter, and
returns a pair (pk, sk) of matching public and secret keys.
Security Comm. Networks 2016; 9:1663–1675 © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. 1665
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Enc, the encryption algorithm, takes as inputs a public key
pk and a plaintext m and returns a ciphertext c = Encpk(m).
Dec, the decryption algorithm, is a deterministic algo-
rithm, which takes as inputs a secret key sk and a ciphertext
c and outputs a plaintext m = Decsk(c) or a special symbol
?, which indicates that the ciphertext was invalid.
2.3. Security notions for digital signature
and public key encryption
Security notions for a digital signature scheme are defined
by pairing an adversarial goal (goal) and an attack model
(atk) [6]. We first review the three main adversarial goals
(goal) for (†, pk) where † is a digital signature scheme
and pk is a public key of †. (1)Total unBreakable (tub):
(†, pk) is said to be tub when no real-life adversary
can compute the secret key sk, which corresponds to pk.
(2)Universal unforgery (uuf): (†, pk) is said to be uuf
when for a randomly chosen message m* from the message
space M, no real-life adversary can forge a valid signature
* on m*. (3)Existential unforgery (euf): (†, pk) is said
to be euf when no real-life adversary can forge a pair of a
message m* and its valid signature *.
Three main attack models (atk) for (†, pk) are as fol-
lows. (i)Key only attack: In this model, an adversary
is allowed to access the empty oracle ", which for any
input, return ?. (ii)Known message attack (kma): In this
model, an adversary is allowed to access the restrictive
signing oracle RS, which on input 0, returns a pair of
a message m and its signature  = Sigsk(m) where m
is chosen from a pre-determined distribution. (iii) Cho-
sen message attack (cma): In this model, an adversary is
allowed to access the signing oracle S, which on input a
message m returns its signature  = Sigsk(m). The pre-
vious goals are considered not achieved if the adversary
submits a query whose answer from the oracle can be
trivially transformed into the correct output.
We remark that the adversarial goals and attack models,
which are mentioned in this section, are only particular
examples, and (in)feasibility results in this paper take into
account all possible adversarial goals and attack models
for both digital signature and public key encryption.
Similarly to the case of digital signatures, security
notions for public key encryption schemes are defined by
pairing an adversarial goal (goal) and an attack model
(atk) [35–37]. We review three main adversarial goals
(goal) for (…, pk) where … is a public key encryption
scheme and pk is a public key of …. (i) Total unBreak-
able (tub): (…, pk) is said to be tub when no real-life
adversary can compute the secret key sk, which corre-
sponds to pk. (2)One-wayness (ow): (…, pk) is said to




where m* is a randomly chosen plaintext from the plaintext
 Rigorously, it is necessary to specify the distribution of the
messages for defining kma, but since our results hold for any
distribution, here we do not strictly specify it.
space M, no real-life adversary can recover m*.
(3)Indistinguishability (ind): (…, pk) is said to be ind
when for a given ciphertext cb = Encpk(mb) where a
plaintext mb 2 {m0, m1} and (m0, m1) are chosen by the
adversary, no real-life adversary can output b0 = b with a
meaningfully higher probability than one-half.
Three main attack models (atk) for (…, pk) are as fol-
lows. (1)Chosen plaintext attack (cpa): In this model,
an adversary is allowed to access the empty oracle ",
which for any input, returns ?. (ii) Plaintext checking
attack (pca, [37]): In this model, an adversary is allowed
to access the plaintext-checking oracle C, which on input
(m, c), returns 1 if m = Decsk(c), otherwise returns 0.
(3)Chosen ciphertext attack (cca): In this model, an
adversary is allowed to access the decryption oracle D,
which on input a ciphertext c, returns a plaintext m =
Decsk(c) or a special symbol ?, which indicates that the
ciphertext was invalid. The previous goals are consid-
ered not achieved if the adversary submits a query whose
answer from the oracle can be trivially transformed into the
correct output.
3. FIXED KEY SECURITY
3.1. Social oracle and fixed key security
As we mentioned, in the real usage of digital signature or
public key encryption schemes, a user is more interested
in the security under a specific key, which he is using as
his public key, rather than the average security under ran-
domly chosen keys. We call a real-life adversary, which
successfully breaks cryptographic primitive X in the sense
of goal.atk under (only) a specific public key pk a fixed
key goal.atk adversary on (X, pk). Here, we say that an
adversary breaks X in the sense of goal.atk if it succeeds
in achieving adversarial goal goal in attack model atk with
probability more than C Pmin + Pc where Pmin is the mini-
mum non-negligible value in practice (with respect to the
life time of pk), C is some constant, and Pc is probability
of succeeding in the attack by random guess. Throughout
this paper, we assume that 1  Pmin  1/2k where k is
the security parameter, and that an event which occurs with
probability less than Pmin will never occur in practice. It is
obvious that for all pk, there always exists such a fixed key
adversary, potentially. However, this does not immediately
imply that for a fixed pk, a successful fixed key adversary
can be always constructed in the real world.
For investigating possibility that such a fixed key adver-
sary actually appears in the real world, we first define fixed
key adversaries as follows.
 This value also depends on human factors. For example, if
computation of at most -bit complexity will become feasible at
the end of the life time of pk, then we can set Pmin = 1/2.
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Definition 1. Let † = (Gen,Sig,Ver) be a digital sig-
nature scheme and pk be a public key of †. We say that
an Algorithm A is a fixed-key goal.atk adversary (resp.
an ˛-strong fixed-key goal.atk adversary) on (†, pk) if
it is a real-life adversary (resp. ˛-practical adversary),
and the following probability is equal to or larger than
CPmin+Pc: Pr[x AOatk (y)] where (C, Pc, x, y) andOatk
are determined by goal and atk, respectively. For exam-
ple, (C, Pc, x, y) = (1, 0, sk, pk),

1, 0, *, (pk, m*)

such
that m* $ M, or

1, 0, (m*, *), pk

if goal=tub, uuf,
or euf, respectively, and Oatk = ",RS, or S if atk=koa,
kma, or cma, respectively (see Section 2.2 for notations).
Similarly, fixed key adversaries for public key encryp-
tion schemes are defined as follows.
Definition 2. Let … = (Gen,Enc,Dec) be a public key
encryption scheme and pk be a public key of …. We say that
an Algorithm A is a fixed-key goal.atk adversary (resp. an
˛-strong fixed-key goal.atk adversary) on (…, pk) if it is a
real-life adversary (resp. an ˛-practical adversary) and the
following probability is equal to or larger than CPmin+Pc:
Pr[(m0, m1, state) AOatk (pk); b $ {0, 1};
cb = Encpk(mb) : x  AOatk (y)] where (C, Pc, x, y) and
Oatk are determined by goal and atk, respectively. For
example, (C, Pc, x, y) = (1, 0, sk, pk),

1, 0, m*, (pk, c*)






(1/2, 1/2, b, (pk, cb, state)) if goal = tub, ow, or ind
respectively, and Oatk = ", C, or D if atk=cpa, pca, or
cca, respectively (See Section 2.3. for notations).
In what follows, Agoal.atk[X,pk] and A˛–goal.atk[X,pk]
denote the set of all fixed-key goal.atk adversaries on
(X, pk) and that of all ˛-strong fixed-key goal.atk adver-
saries on (X, pk), respectively, where X is a digital signature
scheme or a public key encryption scheme and pk is a
public key of X.
Next, we define the presence/absence of fixed-key
adversaries in the real world by introducing social oracle
SO, which models the human society as a massive Turing
machine. For a query (X, pk,goal.atk) where X is a dig-
ital signature scheme or a public key encryption scheme,
pk is a public key of X, and goal.atk is a security notion;
SO returns a successful fixed-key goal.atk adversary on
(X, pk) if and only if it will be actually constructed in the
real world. The social oracle is formally defined as follows.
Definition 3 (Social Oracle). Define that social oracle
SO works as follows.
 For a query (X, pk,goal.atk) where X, pk, and
goal.atk are a digital signature scheme or a pub-
lic key encryption scheme, a public key of X, and a
security notion, respectively; SO returns a program
code of an Algorithm A 2 Agoal.atk[X,pk], which
breaks X in the sense that goal.atk will be actually
implemented at time T 0 for some T 0(< T) and its run-
ning time is less than T – T 0 (Section 2.1). It returns
? otherwise.
 Assume that for a given real-life adversary A1 2
Agoal1.atk1[X,pk], it is always possible to construct
another real-life adversary A2 such that A2 2
Agoal2.atk2[X,pk]. Then, if SO(X, pk,goal1.atk1)
outputs a program code of an Algorithm A1 such
that A1 2 Agoal1.atk1[X,pk], SO(X, pk,goal2.atk2)
always outputs that of another Algorithm A2 such that
A2 2 Agoal2.atk2[X, pk].
The second property of SO seems always provided if
the first property is satisfied, and thus, the second property
might be redundant. However, we require this condition
for proving our main theorems and, therefore, explic-
itly address it in the definition. Now, fixed security can
naturally be defined as follows.
Definition 4 (Fixed Key Security). Let X and pk be a dig-
ital signature scheme or a public key encryption scheme,
and a public key of X, respectively. We say that (X, pk) is
goal.atk secure if SO(X, pk,goal.atk) only outputs ?.
3.2. Naive methods for analyzing fixed
key security
In the mentioned text earlier, we define that (X, pk) is fixed
key secure (i.e., human ignored) if the social oracle does
not output any program code, which harms security of
(X, pk). A naive method for forecasting the answer from the
social oracle is to verify existence of vulnerability for each
of all feasible adversarial strategies. Because, of course, it
is considered impossible in practice, actually the best what
we can do is only to verify that for each of a subset of all
feasible adversarial strategies. Generally, this subset is a
tiny part of all feasible strategies, and consequently, even
if no vulnerability is found out by the previous method,
this is only a very weak evidence that (X, pk) is fixed key
secure. For example, if we want to know whether (†, pk)
is euf.cma secure or not, we have to verify possibility of
signature forgery for each of all messages, which can be
potentially signed under each of all combinations of sign-
ing queries. Obviously, it is impossible to encompass all
of the feasible strategies, and only a tiny part of them can
be verified.
For strengthening the previous naive method, next, we
consider possibility of narrowing the space of all feasible
strategies. Namely, if the number of all feasible strate-
gies is decreased, it becomes possible to encompass a
larger part of them. Because the decrease of the number
of all strategies means that the security notion is weak-
ened, the mentioned text earlier can be interpreted that if
goal1.atk1, security on (X, pk) can be reduced to another
weaker security notion goal2.atk2 on (X, pk) and any vul-
nerability in the sense of goal2.atk2 is not discovered as
Security Comm. Networks 2016; 9:1663–1675 © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. 1667
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far as we can examine; this fact can be a stronger evidence
of goal1.atk1 security on (X, pk) than that by the previous
naive method. For example, if euf.cma security on (†, pk)
can be reduced to uuf.cma security on (†, pk), then we
have to verify possibility of only signature forgery for a
specific message under each of all combinations of signing
queries, and it is considered that the space of all feasible
strategies is significantly narrowed.
Our main result is that unfortunately, it is impossible
to reduce euf.cma security on any (†, pk) to any weaker
fixed key security on (†, pk) under black-box analysis.
Similarly, it is also impossible to reduce ind.cca security
on any (…, pk) to any weaker fixed key security on (…, pk)
under black-box analysis. These results imply that for eval-
uating euf.cma security or ind.cca security, there is no
better method than the previous naive method as long as
we consider only black-box reductions.
For formally stating these results, we address the defi-
nition of fixed key black-box reduction as follows.
Definition 5 (Fixed Key Black-box Reduction). We say
that an oracle Turing machine R is a fixed key black-
box (FKBB) reduction from a fixed key goal1.atk1
adversary on (X, pk) to a fixed key goal2.atk2 adver-
sary on (X, pk) if for every A2 2 Agoal2.atk2[X,pk],
RA2 2 Agoal1.atk1[X,pk] always holds. We denote this by
Agoal1.atk1[X,pk] (R Agoal2.atk2[X,pk]. We also say that
an oracle Turing machine R is a ˛-weak FKBB reduction
from a fixed key goal1.atk1 adversary on (X, pk) to an
˛-strong fixed key goal2.atk2 adversary on (X, pk) if for
every A2 2 A˛–goal2.atk2[X,pk], RA2 2 Agoal1.atk1[X,pk]
always holds. We denote this by Agoal1.atk1[X,pk] (R
A˛–goal2.atk2[X,pk].
We notice that an FKBB reduction has the transi-
tive property. For instance, for given implementations of
an ˛-weak FKBB reduction R1 and an FKBB reduction
R2 such that Agoal1.atk1[X,pk] (R1 A˛–goal2.atk2[X,pk]
and Agoal3.atk3[X,pk] (R2 Agoal1.atk1[X,pk], it is
always possible to explicitly construct another ˛-weak
FKBB reduction R3 such that Agoal3.atk3[X,pk] (R3
A˛–goal2.atk2[X,pk]. For such R1, R2, and R3, we denote
R3 = R1 ı R2 .
Based on Definition 5, we can naturally define
(in)comparability of security notions as follows.
Definition 6 ((In)Compatibility of Security Notions).
We say that goal1 is harder (resp. easier) than
goal2 if for all (X, pk) and atk, it is always pos-
sible to explicitly construct an FKBB reduction R
such that Agoal2.atk[X,pk] (R Agoal1.atk[X,pk]
(resp. Agoal1.atk[X,pk] (R Agoal2.atk[X,pk]) and
that goal1 is incomparable with respect to goal2
if goal1 is not harder nor easier than goal2. Sim-
ilarly, we say that atk1 is weaker (resp. stronger)
than atk2 if for all (X, pk) and goal, it is always
possible to explicitly construct an FKBB reduction
R such that Agoal.atk2[X,pk] (R Agoal.atk1[X,pk]
(resp. Agoal1.atk[X,pk] (R Agoal2.atk[X,pk]) and that
atk1 is incomparable with respect to atk2 if atk1 is not
weaker nor stronger than atk2.
In Section 4, we show that for all (†, pk) and for all
goal.atk, it is impossible to construct any FKBB reduc-
tion from a fixed key goal.atk adversary to a fixed key
euf.cma adversary if goal is harder than euf and atk is
weaker than cma. Similarly, in Section 5, we show that for
all (…, pk), for all goal.atk, it is impossible to construct
any FKBB reduction from a fixed key goal.atk adversary
to a fixed key ind.cca adversary if goal is harder than ind
and atk is weaker than cca. In these sections, we further
clarify that our impossibility results can be applicable to a
significantly wider range of security notions.
4. IMPOSSIBILITY OF FIXED KEY
BLACK-BOX REDUCTION FOR
DIGITAL SIGNATURE
In this section, loosely speaking, we show that it is
impossible to construct any FKBB reduction R such that
Agoal.atk[†,pk] (R Aeuf.cma[†,pk] for all digital sig-
nature scheme †, all public key pk, and all goal.atk if
goal is harder than euf or atk is weaker than cma.
More specifically, the following three facts are clarified:
(i) for all (†, pk) and goal.atk, it is impossible to con-
struct any R such thatAgoal.atk[†,pk] (R Aeuf.cma[†,pk]
if goal is harder than euf, atk is weaker than cma, and
(†, pk) is goal.atk secure (Theorem 1), (ii) for all (†, pk)
and goal.atk, it is impossible to construct any R such
that Agoal.atk[†,pk] (R Aeuf.cma[†,pk] if goal is eas-
ier than uuf, atk is weaker than cma, and (†, pk) is
goal.atk secure (Theorem 2), and (iii) for all (†, pk) and
goal.atk, it is impossible to construct any R such that
Agoal.atk[†,pk] (R Aeuf.cma[†,pk] if goal is harder than
euf, atk is stronger than kma, and (†, pk) is goal.atk
secure (Theorem 3). In Appendix A, we summarize the
previous results in Table A1.
The previous three results intuitively imply that for all
(†, pk) and goal.atk, it is impossible to construct any R
such that Agoal.atk[†,pk] (R Aeuf.cma[†,pk] if goal is
harder than euf or atk is weaker than cma. Actually, this
is almost true (assuming that (†, pk) is fixed key goal.atk
secure), and exceptions are only the following cases: (i)
atk is weaker than cma, but goal is incomparable with
respect to uuf, and (ii) goal is harder than euf, but atk
is incomparable with respect to kma. For example, par-
tial recovery of the secret key (as an adversarial goal) may
be incomparable with respect to uuf. In Table A1, we
summarize the previous results.
Theorem 1. For all (†, pk) where † is a digital sig-
nature scheme and pk is a public key of †, and for all
goal.atk where goal.atk is a security notion such that
goal is harder than euf, and atk is weaker than cma, if
(†, pk) is goal.atk secure, for all ˛ (0 < ˛  1), it is
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impossible to construct even any ˛-weak FKBB reduction
R such that Agoal.atk[†,pk] (R A˛–euf.cma[†,pk].
Proof. For proving the theorem, we first address the
following lemma.
Lemma 1. For all (†, pk) and atk such that atk is
weaker than cma, if (†, pk) is euf.atk secure, for all
˛ (0 < ˛  1) it is impossible to construct any ˛-weak
FKBB R0 such thatAeuf.atk[†,pk] (R0 A˛–euf.cma[†,pk].
Lemma 1 (and its proof) implies that if it is possible
to prove euf.cma[†, pk] security under the assumption
that euf.atk[†, pk] is guaranteed, we can always explicitly
construct a practical adversary, which can break (†, pk])
in the sense of euf.atk[†, pk]. Obviously, this is a contra-
diction and thus, we can conclude that FKBB reduction R0
such that Aeuf.atk[†,pk] (R A˛–euf.cma[†,pk] does not
exist if (†, pk) is euf.atk secure.
Proof of Lemma 1. Towards a contradiction, we assume
that for some ˛, an implementation of an ˛-weak FKBB R
such that Aeuf.atk[†,pk] (R A˛–euf.cma[†,pk] is given.
Then, the theorem is proven by constructing a fixed key
euf.atk adversary B on (†, pk).
We can construct such B by using R as follows. B first
activates R, and then, R starts interacting with a (virtual)
oracle Oatk (which is determined by atk) and a (virtual)
fixed key euf.cma adversary on (†, pk). When R submits
a query to the virtual Oatk, B responds to it in such a way
that B submits the same query to his own Oatk and returns
the answer from Oatk as it is. On the other hand, B does
not need to simulate the euf.cma adversary until R cor-
rectly answers to all queries from B who pretends as the
euf.cma adversary. Therefore, R’s view is perfectly indis-
tinguishable from the normal communication with Oatk
and an euf.cma adversary.
Because for all A 2 A˛–euf.cma[†,pk], RA breaks
(†, pk) in the sense of euf.atk, but R itself cannot (if it
can, this contradicts that (†, pk) is euf.atk secure); it is
guaranteed that R correctly answers to all queries from B
with probability more than Pmin. This is because there may
exist a real fixed key euf.cma adversary, which will out-
put nothing unless all of his queries are correctly answered,
and therefore, R has to succeed in simulating the real attack
environment with probability more than Pmin (because if
it fails, R has to break (†, pk) by itself alone). Hence,
B obtains at least one valid signed message (m*, *) by
interacting with R with probability more than Pmin, and
furthermore, (m*, *) is always available as B’s output (by
carefully choosing queries to R).
Finally, we confirm whether B is a real-life adversary
or not. Because B can be immediately implemented if any
implementation of A 2 A˛–euf.cma[†,pk] is given, thus
assuming that A is implemented at time T 0(< ˛T) and B is
implementable at time T 0 as well. Furthermore, B’s running
time is the same as that of R because B does nothing except
for invoking R, and R’s running time is estimated at most
T – T 0. Notice that by definition, RA’s running time is at
most T –T 0, and consequently, R’s running time is less than
T – T 0. Hence, B’s running time is also at most T – T 0, and
it is a real-life adversary.
Therefore, B works as a successful fixed key
euf.atk adversary, and it can be explicitly constructed
if we are given any implementation of R such that
Aeuf.atk[†,pk] (R A˛–euf.cma[†,pk]. And this contra-
dicts to the assumption that (†, pk) is euf.atk secure.
Next, we address the following lemma, which can be
trivially proven by definition.
Lemma 2. For all (†, pk) and goal.atk such that goal
is harder than euf, it is always possible to construct
an FKBB reduction R such that Aeuf.atk[†,pk] (R
Agoal.atk[†,pk].
Because of Lemma 2, it is guaranteed that an
FKBB R0 such that Aeuf.atk[†,pk] (R0 Agoal.atk[†,pk]
can be explicitly constructed. Therefore, if an ˛-weak
FKBB reduction R such that Agoal.atk[†,pk] (R
A˛–euf.cma[†,pk] can be constructed, then by transitiv-
ity, another ˛-weak FKBB reduction R00 = R ı R0 such
that Aeuf.atk[†,pk] (R00 A˛–euf.cma[†,pk] can be always
constructed as well. Furthermore, assuming that an imple-
mentation of such an R is given, (†, pk) is euf.cma secure
if (†, pk) is goal.atk secure, and this implies that (†, pk)
is euf.atk secure if (†, pk) is goal.atk secure because atk
is weaker than cma. However, because of Lemma 1, it is
shown to be impossible to construct such R00 if (†, pk) is
euf.atk secure, and thus, R cannot be constructed neither,
which proves the theorem.
The previous theorem does not merely mention impos-
sibility for constructing a fixed key goal.atk adver-
sary from a fixed euf.cma adversary but a significantly
stronger result implicating that it is impossible to construct
the former even if a very efficient implementation of the
latter is used. In other words, even if (†, pk) is likely to
be safe in the sense of goal.atk, this does not imply that
even powerful euf.cma adversaries with very short run-
ning time will not appear. Other theorems in this paper also
state similar strong impossibility results.
Theorem 2. For all (†, pk) where † is a digital sig-
nature scheme and pk is a public key of † and for all
goal.atk where goal.atk is a security notion such that
goal is easier than uuf (and thus, may be easier than
or even incomparable with respect to euf) and atk is
weaker than cma, if (†, pk) is goal.atk secure, for all
˛ (0 < ˛  1), it is impossible to construct even any
˛-weak FKBB reduction R such that Agoal.atk[†,pk] (R
A˛–euf.cma[†,pk].
Proof. This theorem can be proven in a similar manner to
Lemma 1. We assume that an implementation of ˛-weak
FKBB R such that Agoal.atk[†,pk] (R A˛–euf.cma[†,pk]
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is given. Then, the theorem is proven by constructing a
real-life adversary B, which breaks (†, pk) in the sense of
uuf.atk (not goal.atk). Namely, if B is an implementa-
tion of a fixed key uuf.atk adversary on (†, pk), then by
using B, it is also possible to construct a fixed key goal.atk
adversary on (†, pk) for all goal such that goal is easier
than uuf.
B first activates R, and then, R starts interacting with a
(virtual) oracle Oatk (which is determined by atk) and a
(virtual) ˛-strong fixed key euf.cma adversary on (†, pk).
When R submits a query to the virtual Oatk, B responds
to it in such a way that B submits the same query to his
own Oatk and returns the answer from Oatk as it is. On
the other hand, B does not need to simulate the ˛-strong
fixed key euf.cma adversary until R correctly answers to
all queries from B who pretends as the ˛-strong fixed key
euf.cma adversary. Therefore, R’s view is perfectly indis-
tinguishable from the normal communication with Oatk
and an ˛-strong fixed key euf.cma adversary.
Similarly to the proof of Lemma 1, B works as a suc-
cessful fixed key uuf.atk adversary, and it can be explicitly
constructed if we are given any implementation of R such
that Aeuf.atk[†,pk] (R A˛–euf.cma[†,pk], which contra-
dicts to the assumption that (†, pk) is goal.atk secure
(because goal is easier than uuf).
Theorem 3. For all (†, pk) where † is a digital sig-
nature scheme and pk is a public key of † and for all
goal.atk where goal.atk is a security notion such that
goal is harder than euf and atk is stronger than kma
(and thus, may be stronger than or even incomparable
with respect to cma), if (†, pk) is goal.atk secure, for
all ˛ (0 < ˛  1), it is impossible to construct even any
˛-weak FKBB reduction R such that Agoal.atk[†,pk] (R
A˛–euf.cma[†,pk].
Proof. This theorem can be proven in a slightly differ-
ent manner from Lemma 1 and Theorem 2. We assume
that an implementation of an ˛-weak FKBB R such that
Agoal.atk[†,pk] (R A˛–euf.cma[†,pk] is given. Then,
the theorem is proven by constructing a real-life adver-
sary B, which breaks (†, pk) in the sense of goal.atk. Let
(C, Pc, x, y) be the constant value, the probability of suc-
ceeding in the attack by random guess, the correct output,
and the input to the adversary, which are determined by atk
(see Definition 1 for details).
B first activates R and inputs y to R. Then, R starts inter-
acting with a (virtual) oracle Oatk (which is determined by
atk) and a (virtual) ˛-strong fixed key euf.cma adversary
on (†, pk). When R submits a query to the virtual Oatk, B
responds to it in such a way that B submits the same query
to his own Oatk and returns the answer from Oatk as it is.
On the other hand, B does not need to simulate the ˛-strong
fixed key euf.cma adversary until R correctly answers
to all queries from B who pretends as the ˛-strong fixed
key euf.cma adversary. Therefore, R’s view is perfectly
indistinguishable from the normal communication with
Oatk and an ˛-strong fixed key euf.cma adversary.
At some point, B (who is simulating an ˛-strong fixed
key euf.cma adversary) is enforced to return a valid
signed message to R. Then, B invokes an FKBB reduc-
tion R such that Agoal.atk[†,pk] (R Agoal.kma[†,pk].
Because atk is stronger than kma, such an R can be always
constructed. B next activates R, and then, R starts interact-
ing with a (virtual) oracle Oatk and a (virtual) fixed key
goal.kma adversary on (†, pk). When R submits a query
to the virtual Oatk, B responds to it by interacting with
his own Oatk. On the other hand, B does not need to sim-
ulate the goal.kma adversary until R correctly answers
to all queries. We note that R’s view is perfectly indistin-
guishable from the normal communication with Oatk and
an goal.kma adversary.
Because for all A 2 Agoal.kma[†,pk], RA breaks (†, pk)
in the sense of goal.atk, but R itself cannot (if it can,
this contradicts to the assumption that (†, pk) is goal.atk
secure); it is guaranteed that R correctly answers to all
queries from B (i.e., simulates the restrictive signing ora-
cleRS) with probability more than Pmin. Hence, B obtains
at least one valid signed message (m*, *) by interacting
with R with probability more than Pmin, and furthermore,
(m*, *) is always available as B’s output. We note that this
is existential forgery because m* is randomly chosen from
the pre-determined distribution. Finally, B returns (m*, *)
to R as the output of the simulated ˛-strong fixed key
euf.cma adversary.
From R’s view, B perfectly simulates a success-
ful ˛-strong fixed key euf.cma adversary (because its
success probability is more than Pmin), and conse-
quently, R eventually outputs the correct x with prob-
ability more than C  Pmin + Pc. B finally outputs the
same value.
Similarly to the proof of Lemma 1, we see that B works
as a fixed key goal.atk adversary, which contradicts to the
assumption that (†, pk) is goal.atk secure.
5. IMPOSSIBILITY OF FIXED KEY
BLACK-BOX REDUCTION FOR
PUBLIC KEY ENCRYPTION
In this section, we discuss the impossibility of FKBB
reduction for the case of public key encryption. In contrast
to the case of euf for digital signature, Pc in ind for public
key encryption is one-half, and this results in the significant
difference in the proofs of the impossibility results. Nev-
ertheless, the obtained results are similar. Namely, roughly
speaking, we show that it is impossible to construct
any FKBB reduction R such that Agoal.atk[…,pk] (R
Aind.cca[…,pk] for all public key encryption scheme …, all
public key pk, and all goal.atk if goal is harder than ind
or atk is weaker than cca.
In Appendix A, we summarize the previous results in
Table A2. Proofs of theorems are given in Appendix B.
Theorem 4. For all (…, pk) where … is a public key
encryption scheme and pk is a public key of … and for
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all goal.atk where goal.atk is a security notion such that
goal is harder than ind and atk is weaker than cca, if
(…, pk) is goal.atk secure, for all ˛ (0 < ˛  1), it is
impossible to construct even any ˛-weak FKBB reduction
R such that Agoal.atk[…,pk] (R A˛–ind.cca[…,pk].
Theorem 5. For all (…, pk) where … is a public key
encryption scheme and pk is a public key of … and for
all goal.atk where goal.atk is a security notion such
that goal is easier than ow (and thus, may be easier
than or even incomparable with respect to ind) and atk
is weaker than cca, if (…, pk) is goal.atk secure, for all
˛ (0 < ˛  1), it is impossible to construct even any
˛-weak FKBB reduction R such that Agoal.atk[…,pk] (R
A˛–ind.cca[…,pk].
Theorem 6. For any (…, pk) where … is a public key
encryption scheme and pk is a public key of … and for
any goal.atk where goal.atk is a security notion such
that goal is harder than ind and atk is stronger than
pca (and thus, may be stronger than or even incompara-
ble with respect to cca), if (…, pk) is goal.atk secure, for
all ˛ (0 < ˛  1), it is impossible to construct even any
˛-weak FKBB reduction R such that Agoal.atk[…,pk] (R
A˛–ind.cca[…,pk].
REFERENCES
1. Canetti R. Universally composable security:a new
paradigm for cryptographic protocols. In IEEE Sym-
posium on Foundations of Computer Science – FOCS
2001. IEEE Computer Society: Las Vegas, Nevada,
USA, 2001; 136–145.
2. Canetti R, Krawczyk H, Nielsen J. Relaxing chosen-
ciphertext security. In Advances in Cryptology –
CRYPTO 2003. Springer: Santa Barbara, California,
USA, 2003; 565–582.
3. Ajtai M, Dwork C. A public-key cryptosystem with
worst-case/average-case equivalence. In ACM Sympo-
sium on Theory of Computing – STOC 1997. ACM: El
Paso, Texas, USA, 1997; 284–293.
4. Peikert C, Waters B. Lossy trapdoor functions and
their applications. In ACM Symposium on Theory of
Computing – STOC 2008. ACM: Victoria, British
Columbia, Canada, 2008; 187–196.
5. Rogaway P. Formalizing human ignorance. In
Progress in Cryptology- VIETCRYPT 2006, 2006;
211–228.
6. Goldwasser S, Micali S, Rivest R. A digital signature
scheme against adaptive chosen message attack. SIAM
Journal on Computing 1988; 17(2): 281–308.
7. Håstad J, Impagliazzo R, Levin LA, Luby M. A pseu-
dorandom generator from any one-way function. SIAM
Journal on Computing 1999; 28(4): 1364–1396.
8. Goldreich O, Goldwasser S, Micali S. How to con-
struct random functions. Journal of the ACM 1986;
33(4): 792–807.
9. Rompel J. One-way functions are necessary and suf-
ficient for secure signatures. In ACM Symposium on
Theory of Computing – STOC 1990. ACM: Baltimore,
Maryland, USA, 1990; 387–394.
10. Naor M. Bit commitment using pseudorandomness.
Journal of Cryptology 1991; 4(2): 151–158.
11. Goldreich O, Micali S, Wigderson A. Proofs that yield
nothing but their validity or all languages in np have
zero-knowledge proof systems. Journal of the ACM
1991; 38(3): 690–728.
12. Impagliazzo R, Rudich S. Limits on the provable con-
sequences of one-way permutations. In Advances in
Cryptology – CRYPTO 1988. Springer: Santa Barbara,
California, USA, 1988; 8–26.
13. Simon DR. Finding collisions on a one-way street: Can
secure hash functions be based on general assump-
tions? In Advances in Cryptology - EUROCRYPT
1998. Springer: Espoo, Finland, 1998; 334–345.
14. Gertner Y, Kannan S, Malkin T, Reingold O,
Viswanathan M. The relationship between public key
encryption and oblivious transfer. In IEEE Symposium
on Foundations of Computer Science – FOCS 2000.
IEEE Computer Society: Redondo Beach, California,
2000; 325–335.
15. Gertner Y, Malkin T, Reingold O. On the impossibility
of basing trapdoor functions on trapdoor predicates. In
IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
– FOCS 2001. IEEE Computer Society: Las Vegas,
Nevada, USA, 2001; 126–135.
16. Reingold O, Trevisan L, Vadhan S. Notions of
reducibility between cryptographic primitives. In The-
ory of Cryptography – TCC 2004, Vol. 2951. Springer:
Cambridge, MA, USA, 2004; 1–20.
17. Kim JH, Simon DR, Tetali P. Limits on the efficiency
of one-way permutation-based hash functions. In IEEE
Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science –
FOCS 1999. IEEE Computer Society: New York, NY,
USA, 1999; 535–542.
18. Gennaro R, Trevisan L. Lower bounds on the effi-
ciency of generic cryptographic constructions. In IEEE
Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science –
FOCS 2000. IEEE Computer Society: Redondo Beach,
California, USA, 2000; 305–313.
19. Gennaro R, Gertner Y, Katz J. Lower bounds on the
efficiency of encryption and digital signature schemes.
In ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing – STOC
2003. ACM: San Diego, CA, USA, 2003; 417–425.
20. Paillier P, Vergnaud D. Discrete-log-based signatures
may not be equivalent to discrete log. In Advances in
Cryptology – ASIACRYPT 2005, Vol. 3788. Springer:
Chennai, India, 2005; 1–20.
Security Comm. Networks 2016; 9:1663–1675 © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. 1671
DOI: 10.1002/sec
A limitation on security evaluation of cryptographic primitives with fixed keys Y. Kawai et al.
21. Paillier P, Villar JL. Trading one-way against chosen-
ciphertext security in factoring-based encryption.
In Advances in Cryptology – ASIACRYPT 2006,
Vol. 4284. Springer: Shanghai, China, 2006; 252–266.
22. Paillier P. Impossibility proof for RSA signatures in
the standard model. In Progress in Cryptology – CT-
RSA 2007, Vol. 4377. Springer: San Francisco, CA,
USA, 2007; 31–48.
23. Fischlin M, Schroder D. On the impossibility of three-
move blind signature schemes. In Advances in Cryptol-
ogy - EUROCRYPT 2010, Vol. 6110. Springer: French
Riviera, 2010; 197–215.
24. Pass R. Limits of provable security from standard
assumptions. In STOC 2011. ACM: San Jose, CA,
USA, 2011; 109–118.
25. Gentry C, Wichs D. Separating succinct non-
interactive arguments from all falsifiable assumptions.
In STOC 2011. ACM: San Jose, CA, USA, 2011;
99–108.
26. Abe M, Groth J, Ohkubo M. Separating short
structure-preserving signatures from non-interactive
assumptions. In Advances in Cryptology – ASI-
ACRYPT 2011, Vol. 7073. Springer: Seoul, South
Korea, 2011; 628–646.
27. Hofheinz D, Jager T, Knapp E. Waters signatures with
optimal security reduction. In Public Key Cryptogra-
phy 2012, Vol. 7293. Springer: Darmstadt, Germany,
2012; 66–83.
28. Wichs D. Barriers in cryptography with weak, cor-
related and leaky sources. In ITCS 2013. ACM:
Berkeley, CA, USA, 2013; 111–126.
29. Fischlin M, Fleischhacker N. Limitations of the meta-
reduction technique: the case of schnorr signatures.
In Advances in Cryptology – EUROCRYPT 2013,
Vol. 7881. Springer: Athens, Greece, 2013; 444–460.
30. Baldimtsi F, Lysyanskaya A. On the security of
one-witness blind signature schemes. In Advances in
Cryptology – ASIACRYPT 2013, Vol. 8270. Springer:
Bengaluru, India, 2013; 82–99.
31. Lewko AB, Waters B. Why proving hibe systems
secure is difficult. In Advances in Cryptology –
EUROCRYPT 2014, Vol. 8441. Springer: Copenhagen,
Denmark, 2014; 58–76.
32. Zhang J, Zhang Z, Chen Y, Guo Y, Zhang Z. Black-
box separations for one-more (static) cdh and its gen-
eralization. In Advances in Cryptology – ASIACRYPT
2014, Vol. 8874. Springer: Kaoshiung, Taiwan, 2014;
366–385.
33. Bernhard D, Fischlin M, Warinschi B. Adaptive proofs
of knowledge in the random oracle model. In Pub-
lic Key Cryptography 2015, Vol. 9020. Springer:
Gaithersburg, MD, USA, 2015; 629–649.
34. Fischlin M. Black-box reductions and separations in
cryptography. In AFRICACRYPT 2012, Vol. 7374.
Springer: Ifrance, Morocco, 2012; 413–422.
35. Dolev D, Dwork C, Naor M. Non-malleable cryptog-
raphy. In ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing
– STOC 1991. ACM: New Orleans, Louisiana, 1991;
542–552.
36. Bellare M, Desai A, Pointcheval D, Rogaway P. Rela-
tions among notions of security for public-key encryp-
tion schemes. In Advances in Cryptology – CRYPTO
1998, Vol. 1462. Springer: Santa Barbara, California,
USA, 1998; 26–45.
37. Okamoto T, Pointcheval D. REACT: Rapid
enhanced-security asymmetric cryptosystem trans-
form. In Progress in Cryptology – CT-RSA 2001,
Vol. 2020. Springer: San Francisco, CA, USA, 2001;
159–174.
1672 Security Comm. Networks 2016; 9:1663–1675 © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
DOI: 10.1002/sec
Y. Kawai et al. A limitation on security evaluation of cryptographic primitives with fixed keys
APPENDIX A: TABLES FOR
SUMMARIZING OUR
IMPOSSIBILITY RESULTS
Table I. Impossibility results on fixed key black-box reductions for digital signatures, where each cell indicates whether for security
notion goal.atk, which is determined by the vertical and horizontal terms, it is (im)possible to construct any fixed key black-box
(FKBB) reduction from a fixed key goal.atk adversary to a fixed key euf.cma adversary or not.
goal ! euf goal ! euf goal ! euf euf ! goal euf ! goal uuf ! goal
goal ! uuf uuf ! goal atk 6$ uuf uuf 6$ goal uuf $ goal euf 6$ goal
atk ! cma
Theorem 1 Theorem 1 and 2 Theorem 1 ? Theorem 2 Theorem 2
atk ! kma
atk ! cma
Theorem 1 and 3 Theorem 1, 2 ,and 3 Theorem 1 and 3 ? Theorem 2 Theorem 2
atk ! kma
atk ! cma
Theorem 1 Theorem 1 and 2 Theorem 1 ? Theorem 2 Theorem 2
atk ! kma
cma ! atk
? ? ? trivial trivial ?
atk 6$ kma
cma ! atk
Theorem 3 Theorem 3 Theorem 3 trivial trivial ?
atk $ kma
cma 6$ atk
Theorem 3 Theorem 3 Theorem 3 ? ? ?
kma ! atk
Specifically, “Theorem X (and Y)” means that any FKBB reduction is proven impossible because of Theorem X (and Y); “trivial” means that FKBB
reductions can be always trivially constructed, and “?” means that it has been still not proven whether FKBB reductions can be constructed or not.
The conditions, which the vertical and horizontal terms determine, are described by using the following notations: goal1 ! goal2 denotes that goal1
is harder than goal2; atk1 ! atk2 denotes that atk1 is weaker than atk2, and goal1/atk1 $ goal2/atk2 denotes that goal1/atk1 is comparable with
respect to goal2/atk2. And goal1/atk1 6$ goal2/atk2 denotes that goal1/atk1 is not comparable with respect to goal2/atk2 (Definition 6). cma, chosen
message attack; kma, known message attack; atk, attack model; uuf, universal unforgery; goal, adversarial goal; euf, existential unforgery.
Table II. Impossibility results on FKBB reductions for public key encryption schemes, where each cell indicates whether for
security notion goal.atk, which is determined by the vertical and horizontal terms, it is (im)possible to construct any FKBB reduction
from a fixed key goal.atk adversary to a fixed key euf.cma adversary or not.
goal ! ind goal ! ind goal ! ind ind ! goal ind ! goal ow ! goal
goal ! ow ow ! goal atk 6$ ow ow 6$ goal ow $ goal ind 6$ goal
atk ! cca
Theorem 4 Theorem 4 and 5 Theorem 4 ? Theorem 5 Theorem 5
atk ! pca
atk ! cca
Theorem 4 and 6 Theorem 4, 5, and 6 Theorem 4 and 6 ? Theorem 5 Theorem 5
atk ! pca
atk ! cca
Theorem 4 Theorem 4 and 5 Theorem 4 ? Theorem 5 Theorem 5
atk ! pca
cca ! atk
? ? ? trivial trivial ?
atk 6$ pca
cca ! atk
Theorem 6 Theorem 6 Theorem 6 trivial trivial ?
atk $ pca
cca 6$ atk
Theorem 6 Theorem 6 Theorem 6 ? ? ?
pca ! atk
Specifically, “Theorem X (and Y)” means that any FKBB reduction is proven impossible due to Theorem X (and Y), “trivial” means that FKBB reductions can
be always trivially constructed, and “?” means that it has been still not proven whether FKBB reductions can be constructed or not. The conditions, which
the vertical and horizontal terms determine, are described by using the following notations: goal1 ! goal2 denotes that goal1 is harder than goal2, and
atk1 ! atk2 denotes that atk1 is weaker than atk2; goal1/atk1 $ goal2/atk2 denotes that goal1/atk1 is comparable with respect to goal2/atk2, and
goal1/atk1 6$ goal2/atk2 denotes that goal1/atk1 is not comparable with respect to goal2/atk2 (Definition 6). goal, adversarial goal; atk, attack model;
pca, plaintext checking attack; cca, chosen ciphertext attack; ind, indistinguishability; ow, one-wayness.
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APPENDIX B: PROOFS OF
IMPOSSIBILITY OF FKBB
REDUCTION FOR PUBLIC KEY
ENCRYPTION
B.1 Proof of Theorem 4
For proving the theorem, we first address the following
lemma.
Lemma 3. For all (…, pk) and atk, if (…, pk) is ind.atk
secure, for all ˛ (0 < ˛  1), it is impossible
to construct any ˛-weak FKBB reduction R0 such that
Aind.atk[…,pk] (R0 A˛–ind.cca[…,pk].
Proof. Towards a contradiction, we assume that an
˛-weak implementation of an FKBB R such that
Aind.atk[…,pk] (R A˛–ind.cca[…,pk] is given. Then, the
theorem is proven by constructing a real-life Algorithm B,
which breaks (…, pk) in the sense of ind.atk.
We can construct such B by using R as follows. B first
picks two random plaintexts m0 and m1, and is given a
ciphertext cb, which is encryption of either m0 or m1.
B next activates R, and then, R starts interacting with a
(virtual) oracle Oatk (which is determined by atk) and a
(virtual) ˛-strong fixed key ind.cca adversary on (…, pk).
When R submits a query to the virtual Oatk, B responds
to it in such a way that B submits the same query to his
own Oatk and returns the answer from Oatk as it is. On
the other hand, B does not need to simulate the ˛-strong
fixed key ind.cca adversary until R correctly answers to
all queries from B who pretends as the ˛-strong fixed
key ind.cca adversary. Therefore, R’s view is perfectly
indistinguishable from the normal communication with
Oatk and an ˛-strong fixed key ind.cca adversary.
Because for all A 2 A˛–ind.cca[…,pk], RA breaks
(…, pk) in the sense of ind.atk, but R itself cannot ((if
it can, this contradicts to the assumption that (…, pk) is
goal.atk secure)); it is guaranteed that R correctly answers
to all queries from B with probability more than Pmin. This
implies that by submitting cb to R, B can obtain decryp-
tion of it with probability more than Pmin. We note that
(1) cb is not prohibited to submit to the decryption ora-
cle which R simulates, and (2) from R’s view, cb merely a
ciphertext of a random plaintext. Therefore, R always treats
cb in the same way as other normal decryption queries.
Hence, B can obtain the underlying plaintext of cb with
probability more than Pmin, and in the case that it can-
not, B outputs a random bit. Then, B correctly guesses
the underlying plaintext of cb with probability more than
1/2  Pmin + 1/2(= Pmin + 1/2(1 – Pmin)). We can also con-
firm that B is a real-life adversary in a similar manner to
Lemma 1.
Therefore, B works as a successful fixed key
ind.atk adversary, and it can be explicitly constructed
if we are given any implementation of R such that
Aind.atk[…,pk] (R A˛–ind.cca[…,pk], and this contradicts
to the assumption that (…, pk) is ind.atk secure.
Next, we address the following lemma which can be
trivially proven by definition.
Lemma 4. For all (…, pk) and goal.atk such that goal
is harder than ind, it is always possible to construct a fixed
key black-box reduction R such that Aind.atk[…,pk] (R
Agoal.atk[…,pk].
Becuase of Lemma 4, it is guaranteed that an
FKBB R0 such that Aind.atk[…,pk] (R0 Agoal.atk[…,pk]
can be explicitly constructed. Therefore, if an ˛-weak
FKBB reduction R such that Agoal.atk[…,pk] (R
A˛–ind.cca[…,pk] can be constructed, then by transitiv-
ity, another ˛-weak FKBB reduction R00 = R ı R0 such
that Aind.atk[…,pk] (R00 A˛–ind.cca[…,pk] can be always
constructed as well. Furthermore, assuming that an imple-
mentation of such an R is given, (…, pk) is ind.cca secure
if (…, pk) is goal.atk secure, and this implies that (…, pk)
is ind.atk secure if (…, pk) is goal.atk secure because atk
is weaker than cca. However, because of Lemma 3, it is
shown to be impossible to construct such R00 if (…, pk) is
ind.atk secure, and thus, R cannot be constructed neither,
which proves the theorem.
B.2 Proof of Theorem 5
This theorem can be proven in a similar manner to Lemma
3. We assume that an implementation of an ˛-weak FKBB
R such that Agoal.atk[…,pk] (R A˛–ind.cca[…,pk] is
given. Then, the theorem is proven by constructing a real-
life adversary B, which breaks (…, pk) in the sense of
ow.atk (not goal.atk). Namely, if B is an implementa-
tion of a fixed key ow.atk adversary on (…, pk), then by
using B, it is also possible to construct a fixed key ow.atk
adversary on (…, pk) for all goal such that goal is easier
than ow.
For given c*, B first activates R, and then, R starts inter-
acting with a (virtual) oracle Oatk (which is determined by
atk) and a (virtual) ˛-strong fixed key ind.cca adversary
on (…, pk). When R submits a query to the virtual Oatk, B
responds to it in such a way that B submits the same query
to his own Oatk, and returns the answer from Oatk as it is.
On the other hand, B does not need to simulate the ˛-strong
fixed key ind.cca adversary until R correctly answers to
all queries from B who pretends as the ˛-strong fixed key
ind.cca adversary. Therefore, R’s view is perfectly indis-
tinguishable from the normal communication with Oatk
and an ˛-strong fixed key ind.cca adversary.
Because for all A 2 A˛–ind.cca[…,pk], RA breaks
(…, pk) in the sense of goal.atk, but R itself cannot (if
it can, this contradicts to the assumption that (…, pk) is
goal.atk secure), it is guaranteed that R correctly answers
to all queries from B with probability more than Pmin. This
implies that by submitting c* to R, B can obtain decryption
of it (i.e., m*) with probability more than Pmin. We note
that R always treats c* in the same way as other normal
decryption queries. Hence, B can obtain m* with probabil-
ity more than Pmin. We can also confirm that B is a real-life
adversary in a similar manner to Lemma 1.
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Therefore, B works as a successful fixed key
ow.atk adversary, and it can be explicitly constructed
if we are given any implementation of R such that
Aeuf.atk[…,pk] (R Aeuf.cma[…,pk], which contradicts to
the assumption that (…, pk) is goal.atk secure (since goal
is easier than ow).
B.3 Proof of Theorem 6
We assume that an implementation of an ˛-weak FKBB
R such that Agoal.atk[…,pk] (R A˛–ind.cca[…,pk] is
given. Then, the theorem is proven by constructing a real-
life adversary B, which breaks (…, pk) in the sense of
goal.atk. Let (C, Pc, x, y) be the constant value, the prob-
ability of succeeding in the attack by random guess, the
correct output, and the input to the adversary, which are
determined by atk (see Definition 2 for details).
B activates R and inputs y to R. Then, R starts interact-
ing with a (virtual) oracle Oatk (which is determined by
atk) and a (virtual) ˛-strong fixed key ind.cca adversary
on (…, pk). When R submits a query to the virtual Oatk, B
responds to it in such a way that B submits the same query
to his own Oatk and returns the answer from Oatk as it is.
On the other hand, B does not need to simulate the ˛-strong
fixed key ind.cca adversary until R correctly answers to
all queries from B who pretends as the ind.cca adversary.
Therefore, R’s view is perfectly indistinguishable from the
normal communication with Oatk and an ˛-strong fixed
key ind.cca adversary.
At some point, B (who is simulating an ˛-strong fixed
key ind.cca adversary) is enforced to commit two plain-
texts m0 and m1, which will be challenged, and R returns
the challenge ciphertext Qcb. Furthermore, at another point,
it is again enforced to outputs the correct guess on the
underlying plaintext of Qcb.
Then, B invokes an FKBB reduction R such that
Agoal.atk[…,pk] (R Agoal.pca[†,pk]. Because atk is
stronger than pca, such an R can be always constructed.
B next activates R, and then, R starts interacting with a
(virtual) oracle Oatk and a (virtual) fixed key goal.pca
adversary on (…, pk). When R submits a query to the vir-
tual Oatk, B responds to it by interacting with his own
Oatk. On the other hand, B does not need to simulate
the goal.pca adversary until R correctly answers to all
queries. We note that R’s view is perfectly indistinguish-
able from the normal communication with Oatk and an
goal.pca adversary.
Similarly to the proof of Lemma 1, we see that B works
as a fixed key goal.atk adversary, which contradicts to the
assumption that (…, pk) is goal.atk secure.
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